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Abstract
Social dilemmas concern a natural conflict between cooperation and self interests among individuals in
large populations. The emergence of cooperation and its maintenance is the key for the understanding of
fundamental concepts about the evolution of species. In order to understand the mechanisms involved in this
framework, here we study the Optional Public Good Games with focus on the effects of diffusive aspects in
the emergent patterns of cyclic dominance between the strategies. Differently from other works, we showed
that rock-paper-scissors (RPS) patterns occur by introducing a simple kind of random mobility in a lattice
sparsely occupied. Such pattern has been revealed to be very important in the conservation of the species in
ecological and social environments. The goal of this paper is to show that we do not need more elaborated
schemes for construction of the neighbourhood in the game to observe RPS patterns as suggested in the
literature. As an interesting additional result, in this contribution we also propose an alternative method to
quantify the RPS density in a quantitative context of the game theory which becomes possible to perform a
finite size scaling study. Such approach can be very interesting to be applied in other games generically.
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation, fairness, or pro-social behavior among non-related individuals is one of
the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences [1]. Reciprocal altruism fails in providing a good
solution if the iterations are not repeated. Some mechanisms as punishment can be effective, for example
in the iterated ultimatum game (UG) where players reject offers far from fifty-fifty division [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
However this mechanism, in the case of prisoner dilemma (PD) or even public goods games (PGG) requires
that defectors must be identified as observed in ref. [7]. Optional participation in the PGG is a simple
but effective mechanism that can avoid possible exploiters and overcome the social dilemma [8, 9], since
the cooperators and defectors can coexist due to the abstention alternative. These works as well as many
others (see for example [10, 11, 12]) consider a dynamics with many public games, where each one of them
corresponds to a different neighbourhood and its central node, differently from some alternative works (not
so explored in literature) that consider the dynamics of an only single and large public goods game with
interacting players (see for example [13, 14]).
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Therefore, the so called Optional Public Goods Game (OPGG) can provide an useful representation
of many social conflicts which the cooperation plays an important role in the good operation of general
public services. Voluntary participation in PGG may provide a way to keep stable and persistent levels
of cooperation, without secondary mechanisms as punishment or reward [15]. In the stationary state of
dynamics in OPGG the coexistence of the three strategies: cooperators, defectors, and loners, as well as
dominance cycles of each one of these strategies in sequence, i.e., the so called rock-paper-scissors (RPS)
regime, were reported as solutions of the mean field replicator dynamics [16], as well as for simulation in
different topologies [11, 12, 17].
Other important aspects may influence the cooperation patterns in PD and PGG and among them, one
has called the attention of physicists that study evolutionary game theory: the mobility of the players [18].
Mobility is an interesting mechanism to evaluate if a social or biological system preserve its environment
or biodiversity by considering the different strategies in the population [19, 18], or by simply to change the
critical rates in epidemiological systems simulated by cellular automata [20]. So, the investigation of RPS
pattern which is an interesting case of emergence of cooperation, deserves more attention in OPGG and in
this point we would asking for: Is the mobility an important ingredient to influence or even preserve the
RPS patterns in OPGG? If yes, for which occupation this can happen?
In this paper we propose to study the effects of mobility in OPGG. We focus our investigation in three
different contributions:
1. First, we would like to answer about the connection between the mobility and RSP patterns observed
in OPPG and in other game theory protocols;
2. In square lattices, where each site can be occupied by only one player, we intend to explain how the
occupation (density of occupied sites) and mobility characterized by a simple diffusion parameter p,
probability that a player moves to a empty site, randomly chosen among nearest neighbours, influence
the RSP patterns;
3. By following this investigation, we would like to propose a parameter to measure the density of RPS
patterns in Game theory, more precisely in PD and PGG with voluntary participation, or even in other
game theory protocols;
In this contribution we present an analysis, by means of Monte Carlo Simulations, looking for the coex-
istence of the two strategies in the steady states or in a more singular and rare case, the alternate dominance
of each single strategy (RPS patterns) in the presence of mobility. We simultaneously analyse the effects of
the multiplication factor (r) , the density of mobile agents in the lattice (ρ) and the mobility parameter (p).
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It is important to notice that other studies considering mobility in OPGG reveal some features to maintain
the cooperation but these results do not explore the existence of cyclic dominance of the strategies (see for
example [10]). More precisely, we are interested in how these three important parameters of the game are
able to modulate the emergence of spontaneous cooperation, looking simply for coexistence of strategies or
cycles of the three possible strategies. In the next section we present the essential points about the model and
how our simulations are implemented considering our Monte Carlo Simulations for OPGG with mobility
of the players. In section 3 we present our main results.
2. The OPGG with Monte Carlo simulations considering mobility of the players
In this paper we consider a population of N players randomly distributed over a square lattice of linear
dimension L, so N ≤ L2 and the density of players is defined by 0 ≤ ρ = NL2 ≤ 1. Every player interacts
only with its nearest neighbours, and each site in the lattice can contain a player or simply to be a vacancy
(empty space). So if we include the vacancy with status of state, we have a four-state model, where each
site can have four possible states: C (cooperator), D (defector), or L (loner) if there is a player occupying
the site which represent the three possible strategies for a player and V (vacancy) otherwise. The OPGG
with Mobility evolves according to steps of the following algorithm:
1. An agent i is randomly chosen.
2. Each cooperator in its neighbourhood contributes to the common pool with a unit of wealth. Defectors
participate, but without contribution (free-rider action), while loners stay out of game getting a fixed
payoff σ , which we make equal to the unit, without loss of generality.
3. Payoffs are then calculated for the three possible strategies:
P=

rNC
(NC+ND)
−1 ; C
rNC
(NC+ND)
; D
1 ; L
(1)
where r is the multiplication factor of the public good, Nc, Nd and Nl are the number of players with
each corresponding strategy in the local configuration (neighbourhood). If we define si = 0 for C,
si = 1 for D and si = 2 for L, we can reduce this formula to:
P(s) =
rNC
(NC+ND)
[
1− s(s−1)
2
]
+ s−1
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4. An occupied site i is randomly drawn. So a site j in the neighbourhood of i is also randomly drawn.
If the site j is a vacancy the player localized in i jumps to site j with probability p. Otherwise, if
P(si) < P(s j) then i copy the strategy of j. If this condition is not satisfied, so i keeps its current
strategy.
5. The process is repeated N times, i.e., we randomly choose N players from the population, and so we
replicate the process. In average each agent has the opportunity to change its state once per Monte
Carlo time step;
So we present time evolution densities of the three kinds of strategies, ρi(t). In all our simulations,
the initial configuration is fixed but random, where the population is composed by 1/3 of the each one of
the three strategies, in order to observe the survival of the strategies. Clearly, other situations should be
biased to lead the system to the emergence of cooperators. However we opted by avoiding this possible
bias. In the next section we present our main results. Basically, we define an interesting parameter to able to
describe the density of RPS patterns in the time evolution of strategies, considering the system over different
occupations and mobilities.
3. Results
In order to investigate the collective dynamical behaviour of the system, we measure the time evolution
of fraction (or density) of individuals in the three possible strategies, ρc = Nc(1−ρ)L2 , ρd =
Nd
(1−ρ)L2 and ρl =
Nl
(1−ρ)L2 , cooperators, defectors, and loners respectively, since (1−ρ)L2 = L2−N is the number of players
in the lattice.
First, we start showing the time evolution of ρc(t), ρd(t), and ρl(t) considering Nmc = 104 Monte Carlo
steps as can be observed in Fig. 1. We choose two particular situations: a) ρ = 0.4 and b) ρ = 0.6,
both considering r = 5 and a low mobility: p = 0.005. As previously reported, we start from an initial
concentration of ρ0c = ρ0d = ρ
0
l = 0.33. This figure reveals two typical patterns in our analysis: In plot
(a), the system reaches a configuration in which the three strategies coexist in a cyclic way while in plot
(b), there is no cyclic dominance among the strategies, just coexistence where two strategies dominate one
third. Now let us better explore the effects of the vacancies and mobility of the players in the emergence of
cooperation or more precisely how this is related to the occurrence of RPS patterns.
Here the idea is very simple: by varying the occupation and a mobility parameters of the system we can
find small fluctuations which leads to large and sustained oscillations, so a cyclic state appears in the global
behaviour of the system, i.e., the fraction of each one must vary cyclically. However, an important question
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators (black line), defectors (red line) and loners (blue line) for r= 5: a) ρ = 0.40,
p= 0.005 and b) ρ = 0.6, p= 0.005. For that we used L= 100, and ρ0c = ρ0d = ρ
0
l = 1/3.
is how to measure the density of the occurrence of this pattern in the time evolution of these strategies
in a simple way. In this paper we suggest a natural parameter: we measure how long is the length of all
L-C-D (or C-D-L, or L-D-C...) sequences that appear during the evolutions. So we establish the following
convention: the condition ρl > ρc,d means L, while ρc > ρl,d means C, and finally ρd > ρc,l corresponds to
the dominance of D. For example, in the sequence with 40 terms:
CCLLLCCDDDLCCCCCDLCCCCDDDDCCCLLCCCCDDCCC
we have 4 LCD cycles, where the density is then equal to α = (8+7+9+8)/40 = 0.8, since in a general
evolution we define α as
α =
∑ j t j
tmax
where {ti}mi=1 denote the set of lengths of all sequences of LCD found in the whole series of size tmax, where
sure ∑ j t j ≤ tmax, which leads to 0≤ α ≤ 1.
So we elaborate an interesting plot that shows 〈ρl〉, 〈ρc〉, 〈ρd〉 and α as function of r, the multiplication
factor of the OPPG as can be observed in Fig. 2. The averages were computed by:
〈ρi〉= 1tmax
tmax
∑
t=1
ρi(t)
where i= l,c, or d, and α were computed considering tmax = 104 MC steps to compose the averages.
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Figure 2: Average frequencies of cooperators (black circles), defectors (red squares), and loners (blue triangles) and the proportion
of rock-paper-scissors cycles (α) (green zone) as a function of multiplication rate r. The three first upper plots correspond to
p= 0.60, with the corresponding density values (a) ρ = 0.1, (b) ρ = 0.5, (c) ρ = 0.6. The three last lower plots correspond to case
p= 0.001 for the same corresponding density values previously used.
This figure qualitatively corroborates that there is a relation between occupation and mobility, however
this relation must be more explored. So we perform a plot of 〈ρl〉, 〈ρc〉, 〈ρd〉 and α as function of ρ as can
be observed in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Average frequencies of cooperators (black circles), defectors (red squares), and loners (blue triangles) and the proportion
of rock-paper-scissors cycles (α) (green zone) as a function of occupation ρ . The right side plot corresponds to p = 0.60 by
considering four different values of multiplication factor (a) r = 1, (b) r = 2, (c) r = 3 and (d) r = 4. The left side plot corresponds
to the case p= 0.001 where the same multiplication factors previously were used.
The idea of low density and high mobility promotes RPS behaviour seems to be qualitatively corrob-
orated by this figure. This figure also shows that for r < 2 the RPS patterns are not observed. However,
an alternative to clear up this point is to observe the proportion α to all pairs (ρ, p). So we elaborate color
maps which show how this proportion changes in all combinations of occupation and mobility which can
be observed in Fig. 4. We show 3 plots that correspond to the 3 different seeds respectively, by showing the
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robustness of the zones obtained for the different seeds, i.e., we can observe similar maps for the different
seeds. For the sake of simplicity, we can qualitatively separate the region in two different regions: I which
corresponds to zone with higher RPS probability (left) and II where just coexistence of two strategies is
generally observed (right).
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Figure 4: Color Map that show the RPS density α for each pair (ρ, p) considering r = 5. The 3 different plots correspond to
different seeds respectively used in our simulations to obtain the time evolution strategies.
So, let us pick up two typical points in the two different zones by exploring their typical behaviour. For
zone I we fix the parameters ρ = 0.20, and p= 0.5 while in zone II we choose ρ = 0.65, and p= 0.5 and
so we built a figure (Fig. 5) that shows the time evolution of strategy densities for these two situations (first
plot from up to bottom) and a corresponding sequence of snapshots by showing the spatial distribution of
strategies in the lattice, for the first situation (medium plot) and for the second situation (lower plot).
The snapshots corresponds to times a) t = 20 b) t = 200, c) t = 400, d) t = 1000 e) t = 2000, and
f) t = 5000 MC steps. We can clearly observe the RPS behaviour for the case chosen in region I while
dominance of a strategy is observed for the case chosen in region II. So we can conclude that with a simple
kind of mobility the RPS patterns can be observed in low occupation and high mobility, but the pattern
occurs continuously.
Finally we studied the effects of L on the density of RPS. So we plot α(ρ) as function of ρ , for different
sizes L = 100,200,400 and 500 which is shown in the main plot of the Fig. 6 in mono-log scale. It is
important to notice that we can observe strong fluctuations for α(ρ) by considering different size systems.
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Figure 5: Upper plot: The time evolutions for two different points in the color map: I ρ = 0.2 and II: ρ = 0.5 with p = 0.5.
Medium plot: Sequence of snapshots for the different times of evolution for the point in I: ρ = 0.2 and p = 0.5. Finally in the
lower plot we show the same sequence for the point in II: ρ = 0.5 and p= 0.5.
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So, in order to perform a finite size scaling analysis, we propose to use the RPS integrated over the different
ρ values, which we define as RPS mass and calculated according to:
S(L) =
∫ 1
0
α(ρ,L)dρ (2)
which is numerically obtained by Simpson’s rule formulae:
S(L) ≈ α(0,L)+α(1,L)3 ∆ρ+ 23∆ρ∑ni=1α(ρ2i−1,L)
+43∆ρ∑
n−1
i=1 α(ρ2i,L)
(3)
We know the numerical error in approximating Eq. 2 by Eq. 3 which is of order O(1/n4), however
we obtained the plots of Fig. 6 by using five different seeds and we have the error bars for each α(ρi,L),
represented by standard error δα(ρi). So by discarding the numerical errors, and considering only the
statistical errors as main sources, we have the uncertainty propagation formulae:
δ 2S =
∆ρ
3
[
δ 2α(0)+δ
2
α(1)+4
n
∑
i=1
δ 2α(ρ2i−1)+16
n−1
∑
i=1
δ 2α(ρ2i)
]1/2
(4)
So we plot S(L) as function of L−1 which is shown in the lower inset plot in 6 with error bars calculated
according to Eq. 4. We can see the strong dependence in the size system. The upper inset plot shows the
case L= 500 in linear scale just for observation.
We can observe that RPS mass decreases as L increases according to algebraic behaviour. So our
conclusions leads to RPS occurrences in the OPGG can be observed in no percolation regime of occupation
when mobility is incremented in the system. Our snapshots show such phenomena by showing that mobility
possibilities encounters between players that starts the RPS process. The phenomena does not occur in
highly occupied lattices and the process is continuous, i.e., the RPS regions has a preferential region in low
occupation that changes slightly from seed to seed. Some sporadic RPS events can be found in percolation
regime (ρ > 0.6) but are not observed in all different color maps corresponding to the different seeds.
4. Conclusion
We have performed a thorough study about emergence of cooperation in OPGG, by showing the ap-
pearance of cycles of rock-paper-scissors patterns among the three possible strategies in an evolutionary
Darwinian dynamics under diffusion effects in lattices with vacancies. We established color maps which
show that more probable regions of RPS patterns occur in more sparsely lattices and intermediate mobili-
ties while we have only coexistence domain in more occupied lattices where the RPS patterns are missing.
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Figure 6: Finite size scaling effects. Density of RPS cycles α as function of lattice occupation ρ in log-log scale. We show plots for
different size systems: L= 100 (triangles) L= 200 (squares), L= 400 (losangles) and L= 500 (circles). We choose the parameters
multiplicative factor r= 3.0 and mobility p= 0.5. The upper inset plot shows the case L= 500 in linear scale where no fluctuations
are observed. The lower inset plot shows the RPS mass S(L) as function of L.
We also explore the numerical relationship between the multiplicative factor r of the OPGG and the RPS
patterns. We also show that RPS mass, i.e., the integral of RPS over all possible occupations, decays as
a power law as the size system enlarges. Our work quantifies RPS patterns emergent in diluted lattices,
or only coexistence patterns, which occurs with simple mobility, differently from other works that explore
more complex diffusion to stablish stable frequency of strategies in steady state (see for example [10]). Our
work corroborates other results obtained in the context of rock-paper-scissors games which suggest that
biodiversity is promoted by mobility (see for example [19]).
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